Discussion on City of Burbank v. Lockheed Air Terminal

City of Burbank v. Lockheed Air Terminal, Inc., 411 U.S. 624 (1973)Parties: The appellant/defendant is the Burbank local council, and the appellee/plaintiff is Lockheed.Process: The appellees filed a suit seeking to halt an order instituted by the appellant. The appellant made it illegal for any aircraft to take off and land at the city airport during a set time, night-day hours. The placement of curfew affected a commercial flight that departed at 11.30 p.m. every Sunday headed for Oakland, California. The suit was first filed in the district court. The court deemed it unconstitutional for the city council to impose the curfew on the commerce clause grounds. The Court of Appeal, upon receiving the suit, affirmed the decision of the district court. The case is now in the supreme court.Issue: The appellees sought an injunction of the night-day curfew placed by the City Council of Burbank to prevent airplanes from taking on and off at the Burbank airport. The move was meant to eliminate noise caused by planes that flew around the neighborhood to grant the residents quiet nighttime.
Facts: The question of preemption was addressed by the Noise Control Act of 1972. In American Airlines v. Hempstead, the judge clarified that aircraft and noise are indivisible, meaning that to exclude noise was to exclude the plane. The noise extends from the airplane itself and hence becomes attached to the plane, just like the plane’s assembly. The Aviation Act under the amended section 611 also involves the Environmental Protection Agency in regulating noise from an aircraft. However, this did not eliminate the role of the state and local government councils in setting standards and requirements for the regulation of noise in aircraft.Analysis/Rationale: The court held that the by-law by the Burbank council contrasted with the interests that the F.A.A. is empowered to control. The F.A.A. is already granted the power to regulate aircraft in abating noise problems, found in the Federal Aviation Act of 1968 section 611, which was amended in the 1972 Act. The court held that the Federal Administration Agency already had set appropriate control standards for the regulation of aircraft noise. Hence, the state and local governments councils cannot oust the Federal Administration Agency in its role in controlling airplane noise. The court did not reach the question of the district court invalidating the ordinance based on the Commerce Clause. The Burbank code made an exception to emergency takeoffs. The code only affected one flight per week. The accumulation of these factors denied the reason of burden on commerce its viability and validity in the present courts. In a divided vote, the court withheld that the Burbank ordinance contrasted clearly stated roles and policies of the F.A.A.Holding: The court preempts the influence of local councils and the state over aircraft noise. Since noise pollution is well addressed in the Noise Control Act of 1972, noise control was to rest in the F.A.A. in conjunction with the Environmental Protection Agency.Conclusion: Affirmed.Bibliography.William W. Bratton, The Preemption Doctrine: Shifting Perspectives on Federalism and the Burger Court, Columbia Law Review 75, no. 3 (1975): 62354; William Natbony, City of Burbank v. Lockheed Air Terminal, Inc.: Federal Preemption of Aircraft Noise Regulation and the Future of Proprietary Restrictions Comment, New York University Review of Law and Social Change 4, no. 1 (1974): 99114; and R. A. G., Jr., Shifting Aircraft Noise Liability to the Federal Government, Virginia Law Review 61, no. 6 (1975): 12991337.